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Between “Autistic” Courts and Mob Justice: Theorizing the 
Call for More “Democratic” International Criminal Justice 
 
Marlies Glasius 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
In the last few years, the literature on international criminal courts has shifted from legal 
enthusiasm over the exciting new frontiers in legal and institutional development to a 
more critical debate in which anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, and many 
interdisciplinary scholars also participate. There are three interrelated lines of critique, 
pursued to different degrees by different authors. The first is a general questioning of 
whether the exclusive focus on punitive “trial” justice is in fact helpful for the victims of 
war crimes and crimes against humanity and the wider societies that have suffered from 
such atrocities. The second points out that in ongoing conflicts, the pursuit of such justice 
may get in the way of the pursuit of peace through negotiations. The third concerns the 
“remoteness” of these courts from the lived realities of the populations affected by the 
crimes they prosecute. 
   On the first two points, the arguments on both sides are well rehearsed. Indeed, in 
relation to the first point it could be argued that a consensus is emerging in the scholarly 
literature, although certainly not yet in policy practice, that international criminal courts 
ought to be part of a wider package of transitional justice instruments at the various 
policy levels. 
   The third critique, however, has not received much attention. In this line of analysis, the 
point is usually made that the victims and populations have not been consulted and have 
not had a choice as to whether international criminal courts are their preferred form of 
justice.1 Critics and even advocates of international courts demand a procedurally 
different implementation of justice. International criminal courts are asked to be more 
communicative, more deliberative, indeed, more democratic in the sense given to this 
term in the literature on participatory or deliberative democracy. 
   This article will not attempt to contribute to the already lively discussions on whether 
and when Western-style “trial justice” is more or less appropriate than other forms, or 
how to resolve tensions between the interests of justice and the interests of peace. Instead, 
it will consider the claim underlying the third line of critique: for criminal proceedings to 
be legitimate in an absolute normative sense, they need to be legitimated through 
deliberative consultation generating consent.  
   First, it will briefly discuss the formal legal basis of each of the courts and how this 
relates to the concept of democratic legitimacy. This will be followed by a more detailed 
examination of the kinds of “democracy demands” that are being made of international 
criminal courts, and how they have been responding. Then it will assess these 
developments through the lens of classical and recent theories in legal sociology and 
legal anthropology: in what ways does this body of literature conceptualize the 
relationship between “normal” criminal proceedings and the democratic legitimacy of 
legal institutions? Furthermore, can these conceptualizations be transferred to the rather 
exceptional situation of international tribunals for very grave crimes? 
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   In the remainder of this article, the term “international criminal courts” will denote 
international criminal justice institutions in the abstract. I will use “the courts and 
tribunals” to refer to actually existing institutions and their practices. These include such 
entities as the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC); the 
International Criminal Court (ICC); the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR); the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY); and the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). I will use “crimes against humanity” as shorthand 
for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide—the typical remit of these 
institutions. 
 
II.  Formal Legal Basis 
 
The courts and tribunals that have come into existence since the 1990s were established 
in different ways. This section will briefly discuss these differences and relate them to the 
question of democratic legitimacy. The point here is not to discuss the legality of these 
courts and tribunals under international law. Instead, it will be argued that the differences 
that may be crucial to legal scholars in terms of legality, and have excited much debate 
between them, are of only limited relevance to the question of democratic legitimacy. 
   The Yugoslavia tribunal, the first post-Nuremberg court of its kind, was established 
through a Resolution of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The UNSC stands 
out in the post-World War II international architecture as a crucial exception to the 
principle of state consent, required for the maintenance of international peace and 
security. Its conception of threats to the peace was famously stretched, and its capacity 
for action unleashed, after the end of the Cold War. This is clearly expressed in its 
Resolution 827. The ongoing breaches of humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia are 
declared to be a threat to the peace, a tribunal is established, and the Council 
peremptorily “decides that all States shall cooperate fully with the International 
Tribunal.”2 Regardless of its legality, it would be very difficult to construct any sort of 
argument that this process of establishing an international tribunal contained any element 
of democratic consent from a global—or local—demos. 
   The situation of the Rwanda tribunal is slightly different. Although also based on a 
Security Council Resolution, its establishment followed an official request from the 
government of Rwanda. However, this was the RPF government, formed by the Tutsi 
army that vanquished the genocidaires in the summer of 1994, rather than a 
democratically elected government. Moreover, it soon withdrew its support for the 
tribunal. 
   The ICC’s position is similar to that of the ICTY in relation to its Darfur case. It was 
also mandated by the Security Council without consent from the state in question, Sudan. 
Its other current cases all concern states that have ratified the ICC Statute, and three of 
the governments actually referred situations to the ICC, a procedure not foreseen by the 
Statute. However, these instances of state consent do not reflect democratic consent 
unproblematically. Uganda is a one-party state, and the democratic credentials of the 
Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo are weak at best. 
Although multi-party elections are held, they are flawed by violence, the exclusion of 
opposition candidates, and fraud. Civil liberties are routinely violated. In Kenya, it is the 
violence associated with the elections themselves that forms the substance of the ICC’s 
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case. This is hardly surprising: we should not expect to find a robust democracy and 
respect for civil rights coinciding with situations that have come to the attention of 
international criminal courts. 
   The ECCC is the result of protracted negotiations between the United Nations and the 
Cambodian government. Again, although we have state consent here, it can hardly be 
equated with democratic consent, firstly because the Hun Sen government is highly 
undemocratic, and secondly because it accepted the Court reluctantly, under pressure.3 
The SCSL is perhaps the international tribunal that comes closest to having been 
established through democratic consent. It was established by an agreement between the 
United Nations and the government of Sierra Leone through the explicit request of 
President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, one month after he had won a landslide victory in the 
first post-civil war elections. Even in this situation, however, it remains arguable whether 
the people themselves have given consent to the extraordinary hybrid body that has come 
to pass judgment on the main actors in the conflict. If we accept Jürgen Habermas’ 
dictum that “democratic procedure for the production of law…forms the only 
postmetaphysical source of legitimacy,” then the courts and tribunals are all in trouble.4 
   Having established the shaky democratic ground the courts and tribunals rest on, the 
next section will look more closely at what kind of concrete “democracy critiques” they 
have been exposed to, and how they have responded to date. 
 
III.  The Critiques and Demands 
 
A first set of critiques focuses on the neglect of international criminal courts to 
adequately explain themselves. Diane Orentlicher, for instance, argues that the 
Yugoslavia tribunal “has never placed adequate store in the importance of 
communicating effectively with the communities most affected by its work… 
Remarkably, the ICTY did not even translate its judgments into the languages spoken in 
the former Yugoslavia until 1999, and did not issue its first press release in Serbian until 
2000.”5 
   In relation to the ICC’s Uganda case, Adam Branch complains of “what many Acholi 
[the most war-affected of the peoples inhabiting Northern Uganda] whom I have 
interviewed perceive to be the ICC’s lack of transparency and its aloof and secretive 
demeanor” and its “nontransparent decision-making process.”6 Jose Alvarez has asserted 
that the ICTR’s judgments have had far less local media (especially radio) coverage than 
national trials related to the genocide, leaving Rwandans without a “sense of 
ownership.”7 
   From these and other statements, it appears that the authors consider it to be self-
evident that international criminal courts have a responsibility to explain themselves to 
affected communities. Without arguing to the contrary, it must be noted that such a 
responsibility is not necessarily taken for granted in the pursuit of “normal” domestic 
criminal justice. But the demands of the critics go well beyond better information 
provision by the Courts. 
   Writing about the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals, Victor Peskin makes a distinction 
between the transparency model of outreach, along the lines described above, and a 
(preferable) “more comprehensive and multifaceted” engagement model, that would 
involve “extensive and frequent…interaction and dialogue” between tribunal staff and the 
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population.8 In a similar vein, Payam Akhavan has insisted that international criminal 
courts engage in “participation and public dialogue” as especially important to facilitating 
ownership and hence contributing to post-conflict peace building and collective healing.9 
   In relation to the Rwanda tribunal, Peskin suggests that such engagement “may also 
help Tribunal officials better understand how the court and the outreach programme are 
perceived domestically” in Rwanda and break down their “self-imposed isolation from 
Rwandan society.”10 Similarly, Orentlicher has argued that “[t]he failure of key ICTY 
staff and officials to educate themselves adequately about the Balkans has often been 
evident and deleterious.”11 Instead, she suggests, they ought to be “keeping constantly in 
mind the impact of proceedings on core audiences as trial and public information 
strategies are developed.”12 Branch, too, argues that the ICC in its Uganda case “failed to 
undertake either the independent political analysis or the consultation with the Acholi that 
might have alerted it to the potential negative consequences of its investigation.”13 
   But what are the courts and tribunals meant to do once they have made this analysis? 
Should they be making different decisions in order to prevent a negative impact? Or is 
the suggestion just that they explain themselves better, as above? Peskin uncritically 
asserts that dialogue can take place “without undermining the Tribunal’s autonomy.”14 
Orentlicher remains cautious, arguing only that, “there is an inherent tension between a 
court’s awareness of its local audience on the one hand and its institutional imperative to 
focus on doing justice in the specific case before it.”15 Branch is less shy about what is 
normatively required for international criminal courts like the ICC to be legitimate in 
situations like Northern Uganda: “even if the Acholi were eventually to call for 
international prosecution, such prosecution would only be legitimate if it were in 
response to this prior deliberative process and not by fiat of the Ugandan government and 
the ICC prosecutor.”16 Once in action, the “ICC would…need to work at the behest of 
and in coordination with democratic forces.” At the same time, he recognizes this “is 
difficult since it would require that the ICC make judgments as to the democratic 
credentials of those calling for intervention.”17 
   Other critics have made the same argument in much more general terms. Helena 
Cobban, in a cogent argument against international criminal courts in Foreign Policy, 
argues that, “those who want to help the survivors of atrocities should first ask broad 
sections of society in an open-ended way how they define their own needs and how they 
define justice.”18 Mark Drumbl, who does not reject international criminal courts quite so 
categorically, also argues that, “ICTY and ICTR are not directly accountable to 
populations in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda,”19 and that the Sierra Leone tribunal 
“does little to incorporate local manifestations of popular will.”20 He uses the phrase 
“popular disenfranchisement”21 to describe the position of local populations in relation to 
all the courts and tribunals. 
 
IV.  The Responses 
 
The critiques and demands made on the courts and tribunals in their communicative 
aspect have not left them untouched. They have all developed “outreach strategies,” for 
which there is typically no parallel in domestic criminal justice systems. The main focus 
of these strategies is on the provision of information and explanation to a variety of 
audiences, primarily in the localities with which the court investigations and prosecutions 
6 
 
are dealing. The first of these tribunals, the ICTY, took six years to develop such a 
strategy or even to translate its judgments into local languages. Having recognized how 
this neglect contributed to negative perceptions, it now defines its mandate as making the 
Tribunal’s “trials and judgements accessible and understandable in the region of the 
former Yugoslavia” and “actively explain[ing] its work to the communities it serves in 
the region.”22 
   Similarly, the ICC’s “Strategic Plan for Outreach,” developed in response to criticism 
of its lack of outreach,23 explains that for the Court to fulfill its mandate, “it is imperative 
that its role and judicial activities are understood, particularly in those communities 
affected by the commission of crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction. The Court must 
therefore put in place mechanisms to ensure that affected communities can understand 
and follow the Court.”24 
   All the courts and tribunals operationalize this commitment in similar activities: in the 
production of leaflets and booklets in various languages; the transmission of (parts of) 
trial proceedings; the organization of seminars and town hall meetings to which court 
staff travel to give presentations; the appearance of court staff in local media (especially 
radio programs); and the arrangements to allow victims, civil society actors, journalists, 
local officials, and legal professionals to visit the courts and tribunals. A more specific 
instance of this commitment to transparency is exemplified by the ICTY’s website 
explanation of the benefits of accepting guilty pleas and publication of these pleas. 
   The outreach documents, as well as some statements and writings by civil society 
actors who favor the courts and tribunals, tend to assume, if not an automatic, at least a 
strong connection between the provision of good information and support for 
international criminal courts. The ICC’s Strategic Plan, for instance, posits that, “[t]his 
communication should serve first of all to increase the confidence of these communities 
in the international criminal justice system, since they will be better informed about the 
Court and its role.” The Sierra Leone court’s briefing paper, which marked the first 
attempt at developing an outreach strategy before operations began, remarks more 
cautiously but in the same vein that the strategy outlined “stands the best chance of 
ensuring the Special Court’s transparency and credibility, and promoting the notion of it 
being an inclusive institution, serving the needs of the people of Sierra Leone for 
effective accountability for the conflict in their country.”25 The outreach team of the 
Yugoslavia tribunal, despite continued high levels of hostility to it in the region, actually 
claims on its website that this effect has already been achieved: “Access to accurate 
information has served to dispel myths and prejudices about the Court.” 
   Given the scope of the enterprise and the limited resources, it comes as no surprise that 
neither the Yugoslavia tribunal nor the Sierra Leone court has been able to achieve 
anything approaching comprehensive levels of explanation and information provision.26 
This article, however, is particularly interested in the nature of the engagement, rather 
than its scope. While the emphasis remains on one-way communication, as seen 
previously, the courts and tribunals have begun to go beyond this one-way model. 
   Affected communities and special groups are not exclusively constructed as recipients 
of messages. It is also recognized that they must be “given a voice.” Naturally, they 
already have a voice, and it is often a critical one. Discussion about court cases in the 
media and in informal conversations is nothing unusual from the perspective of “normal” 
criminal justice. But a voice as recognized by the institution is different in nature. 
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   The ICC has perhaps the most formalized (but also restrictive) voice for victims in the 
form of the Victims’ Counsel in the Court. The Yugoslavia tribunal has a section on its 
website titled “Voice of the Victims,” which displays the testimonies of a number of 
victim witnesses to the tribunal. It does not explain, however, why this section exists or 
what purpose it is supposed to serve. In the early days of its outreach program, the Sierra 
Leone court formulated the aim not only of ensuring that the purpose of the Special Court 
is understood across Sierra Leone, but also to grant to all sections of civil society in the 
country the opportunity to have their voice heard and their expectations of the Court 
identified.27 In 2005, a conference of Sierra Leonean civil society groups did indeed take 
up this invitation and developed “a set of performance evaluation criteria” by which civil 
society will assess the impact of the Special Court both during and after its lifetime.28 
   The recognition of a voice does not in itself imply that the courts and tribunals respond 
to voices from affected communities or particular groups. But it turns out that they have 
done just that, at least at the rhetorical level. The Sierra Leone court, in one of its annual 
reports, specifies the purpose of outreach as to “foster two-way communication between 
Sierra Leoneans and the Special Court.”29 The ICC website similarly defines outreach as 
“a process of establishing sustainable, two-way communication between the Court and 
communities affected by the situations that are subject to investigations or proceedings.” 
Its strategic plan lists as one of its objectives, “to respond to the concerns and 
expectations expressed in general by affected communities and by particular groups 
within these communities.” This objective found perhaps its first expression in prosecutor 
Moreno-Ocampo’s decision to meet with Acholi traditional, religious, and political 
leaders to explain the controversial decision to investigate the situation in Northern 
Uganda: “He explained that he had invited the Acholi leaders to hear their views, as he 
had a responsibility to take into account the interests of victims and the interests of 
justice.”30 
   According to the ICC’s strategic plan, this two-way communication will “enable the 
Court to better understand the concerns and expectations of the communities so that it 
could respond more effectively and clarify, where necessary, any misconceptions.” 
Perhaps based on its Ugandan experience, traditional leaders (more than victims) are 
singled out as partners in a two-way dialogue. The communication is intended to foster: 
 
…discussions of the articulation between international criminal justice and 
local and traditional justice modes of resolving conflicts, and should 
provide ample opportunity for these groups to express their questions and 
concerns. Such an approach will assist the Court in gaining knowledge 
from local understanding and experience.31 
 
   In more general terms, the ICTY website explains how dialogue will “also enable 
interlocutors from the former Yugoslavia to relay their perceptions of the Tribunal’s work 
to ICTY representatives, improving their understanding of the impact of the ICTY’s trials 
and judgements.” 
   But what will they do with this improved understanding? And what if the concerns 
from communities are not based on lack of information, but express a clear desire for a 
change in (for instance, prosecutorial) policy? It remains nebulous in all these accounts to 
what extent and in what ways these Courts are prepared to respond to such demands. If 
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Court officials do not seriously consider shifting policies in response to community 
demands, they will continue to face criticisms like the ones outlined above. Yet if they 
do, they may be in breach of other values classically associated with fair trials. 
   The dilemma is neatly illustrated by two statements from officials of the Yugoslavia 
tribunals. In 2005 in an outreach meeting in Bosnia, then ICTY Registrar David Tolbert 
said, “I’ve always viewed the Tribunal as really your Tribunal. It’s not our Tribunal.”32 
But ICTY President Fausto Pocar explained to a researcher in an interview that, “when 
judging a particular defendant the Tribunal’s imperative is to apply and be guided by 
‘neutral principles of justice. We shouldn’t have a second agenda’ such as considering 
how or whether this judgment ‘may help or not help reconciliation.’”33 The same 
contradiction is summed up by the five general principles of the ICC’s outreach strategy: 
neutrality; independence, engagement, flexibility, and partnership.34 
   It would appear, then, that the courts and tribunals accept that they do suffer from a 
deficit relating to democratic legitimacy. But the rhetoric of the ICTY Registrar quoted 
above notwithstanding, no Court officials appear to have gone as far as suggesting that 
their decision-making must have a direct democratic basis, as argued by Branch, Cobban, 
and Drumbl. 
 
V.  Theorizing the Contradiction 
 
The purpose of the rest of this essay is to seek guidance from legal sociological and 
anthropological conceptions of the role of criminal courts in society to determine how 
international criminal courts should resolve the obvious contradictions between the 
requirements of neutrality and independence, on the one hand, and the need for 
engagement, flexibility, and partnership, on the other. Because of the obviously social—
rather than purely moral—nature of the dilemma under investigation, this literature is 
expected to offer a more fruitful point of departure than the natural law tradition that is 
the half-explicit moral foundation of the courts and tribunals. 
   The emphasis is on the legal sociology of modern Western states, as international 
criminal courts are decidedly products of Late Modern Western thought, but cut loose 
from statist moorings. Yet legal anthropology is also needed, as the courts and tribunals 
respond to situations that cannot be readily understood in terms of pre-modern, modern, 
or post-modern, but which are (with perhaps a partial exception for the former 
Yugoslavia) certainly not Western. 
   There are, of course, limitations to this approach. First of all, legal sociologists, when 
writing theoretically rather than empirically, have a tendency to write about law in an 
abstract sense. This piece, however, is less concerned with the general acceptance and 
legitimacy of law as rules than with law as institutions, in casu criminal courts. 
Moreover, the emerging literature on courts and tribunals is exercised by the behavior 
and decision-making of prosecutors at least as much as by judges. The classics of legal 
sociology either speak to legal professionals in general or to judges in particular, and are 
almost wholly silent about the particular role of criminal prosecutors. Finally, it is simply 
not possible to begin to do justice to the volumes of more than a century of work in the 
areas of legal sociology and legal anthropology in the space of an article. I issue an 
apology and disclaimer in advance: the essay may be summarizing intricate systems of 
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thought to the point of caricature in order to quickly jump to their potential application to 
twenty-first century international criminal courts. 
 
VI.  Marxism to Governmentality: Domination with a Loophole 
 
There is a large and varied tradition in legal sociology that runs all the way from 
instrumental Marxism to the more subtle “governmentality” approaches of Foucault and 
others. For Marx, law within the capitalist mode of production is a straightforward 
instrument to keep the working classes in their place. In more subtle representations, such 
as structural Marxism (Pashukanis 1978), repressive formalism (Edelman 1979), and 
Foucaultian analysis (Pratt 1998), the legal order can be relatively autonomous from 
particular capitalist forces. In governmentality approaches there is not necessarily even a 
capitalist driver behind the pervasive control mechanisms of the power/knowledge 
complex. Yet the emphasis on formal equality still obscures inequality and produces 
consent.35 By and large, the dilemma posed in this article is a non-question for these 
schools of thought. Courts of law, and by extension also international criminal courts, are 
not in any way conceptualized as having democratic legitimacy. Their independence from 
state interests and impartiality in decision-making are elaborate fictions. Instead, they act 
to legitimatize an unjust, unequal order. This is their function and they cannot be 
otherwise. 
   Yet there is a loophole in this line of thought that opens up the possibility of a different 
functioning of courts in general, and international criminal courts in particular, in the 
dialectics of struggle. In this conceptualization, some marginalized or underprivileged 
individuals benefit from the Rights discourse, while at the same time contributing to the 
legitimation of a still structurally unjust order. In the nightmare version of this line of 
thought, any critical engagement with an international criminal court merely stabilizes the 
unjust order by allowing it to improve its cosmetic appearance.36 In a less deterministic 
interpretation of this neo-Gramscian avenue, such critical engagement might actually 
destabilize and adjust the social order. Thus, Marxist historian E. P. Thompson has 
suggested that in Western capitalist contexts, “the legitimacy of the rule of law provides a 
significant political weapon for the ‘have-nots’…since it necessarily provides them with 
the protection of known or knowable rules, limits arbitrary discretion, and forces many 
valuable legal concession from the powerful.”37 
   In this reading, the “democratic engagement” of international criminal courts would be 
instrumental rather than foundational, with the object being social change rather than 
democratic legitimation. The point here is access for the marginalized, rather than 
majority consent. There is something to be said for this point of departure in the deeply 
unequal and undemocratic contexts in which international criminal courts typically 
operate, and in which, moreover, it is obvious that they can only make minor inroads into 
the substantive injustice of the situation. More specifically, the emphasis of the courts 
and tribunals on victims gives space for such a reading. Even if it is true that courts and 
tribunals instrumentalize and “craft” victims to fit their own concepts of justice,38 the 
victims may equally use courts and tribunals for their own projects of restoring their self-
esteem and their position in society.39 
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A.  Penal Law 1.0: Community Expiation by the Collective Conscience 
 
1.  Durkheim 
 
In Emil Durkheim’s influential conception, law is an expression of the norms of a 
“collective conscience,” aimed at fostering organic solidarity. This famous collective 
conscience is “the totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens of the 
same society.”40 Durkheim argued that in ancient societies the administration of penal 
law had a religious character. Penal law, administrated through “a definite organ as 
intermediary” (96) symbolizes solidarity, but also strengthens it: “the institution of this 
power serves to maintain the common conscience itself”(104). However, Durkheim has 
very little to say about the “definite organ” itself or how it remains continually in touch 
with the collective conscience. This is less surprising when one reads his often 
decontextualized collective conscience as it was intended: the ideal type of law before 
society’s transition to a modern Western capitalist state, which is characterized by 
division of labor and contract law. He saw penal law as particularly expressive of 
primitive, more solidaristic societies, and regressive in modern Western ones. 
   It is this reading of Durkheim that is the point of departure for Nonet and Selznick, who 
see law as developing in three phases, with “repressive law” as its first phase.41 Unlike 
Durkheim, and rather importantly for this essay, they do problematize the role of the 
“definite organ,” which they see as implementation of the coercive needs of those in 
power as much as the expression of collective consciousness (see also Von Gierke). In 
Nonet and Selznick, this phase is characterized both by a close integration of law, 
morality, and politics (which they like) and by rampant official discretion (which they do 
not).42 
   Max Weber’s account is somewhat different. While he echoes Durkheim on traditional 
penal law as related to “magic” and prophesying, he believes that in the majority of cases, 
there is little distinction between “crimes” and private disputes. In either case, the injured 
party seeks redress or revenge, although sometimes through the medium of elders, 
priests, or a full community assembly. This is still a form of mediated self-help. Only in 
the case of injury against the whole community, such as blasphemy or treachery, would 
there be some form of collective punishment. For Weber, this form of justice (putatively 
attributed to the Muslim “Khadi courts”) was “substantive irrational,” or concerned with 
substantive justice, but arbitrary due to its connection with temporal authorities.43 
 
2.  Anthropological Accounts 
 
Early anthropological accounts nuance Durkheim’s idealtypical division between 
primitive societies characterized by penal law and modern societies in which civil law is 
much more developed. Yet they resonate with Durkheim’s account of early criminal law 
as both an expression and a necessary solidifier of social cohesion, as well as being 
interdependent with—but not originating in—the supernatural.44 Bronislaw Malinowski, 
moreover, confirmed Weber’s “substantive irrational” verdict both in terms of the 
unpredictability of the consequences of crime and the inclination of administrators of 
justice (in the form of sorcerers) to side with “those in power—chiefs, men of rank and 
wealth.”45 Adamson Hoebel sided with Durkheim in asserting that even “private 
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prosecution” depends on societal sanction. He defined Durkheim’s “definite organ” as 
“an individual or group possessing the socially recognized privilege” to apply physical 
force, elaborating the forms this can take among “primitive peoples,” ranging from 
private to public and from democratic (in the Athenian sense of involving all free men) to 
hereditary. Yet he insisted that there is a general tendency to follow the group’s 
conviction of what is right.46 The same point is also stressed by Ehrlich, who can be read 
as an early anthropologist of his own society. He famously pointed out that formal laws 
make up only a tiny fraction of the social rules even in Western societies, and that the real 
sanction of law most felt and applied is exclusion from social life rather than a court 
verdict.47 In other words, the anthropological classics tended to confirm Durkheim’s 
argument that in “primitive” societies, there was a close association between criminal law 
and collectively held values, expressed by whoever happened to be the administrators of 
justice. 
 
3.  Whose Collective Conscience? 
 
Despite the intended historicization of Durkheim’s claim, and some evidence that in 
Western societies values are in reality only shared at the elite level,48 penal law as an 
expression of common values is still the default position of most mainstream legal 
sociologists and those legal practitioners who think beyond natural law. According to 
Roger Cotterrell, for instance, in modern Western societies, “law ultimately reflects and 
depends on the society’s shared values,” even though tensions may arise due to the slow 
adjustment of legal norms to social change.49 
   At the level of international criminal courts, two additional problems arise with the 
“collective conscience.” The first is that it is even harder to imagine such a normative 
consensus existing in a society where crimes against humanity have recently been or are 
still being committed than in a relatively stable society. 
   The second is that, even if we accept that there still is a society that may or may not 
have such a consensus, international criminal courts, even hybrid ones, are not in it or of 
it. In order to transpose Durkheim’s indirect democratic legitimation through collective 
conscience to the global level, we have to believe in a collective conscience of mankind. 
But such a conscience, invoked in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, remains 
an article of faith that cannot be tested or disproved. Durkheim himself is contradictory 
on this point. On the one hand, he posits that each nation has its own distinctive 
morality,50 but on the other hand, he argues that, “there is in all healthy consciences a 
very lively sense of respect for human dignity,”51 which perhaps leaves the possibility 
open that some societies have unhealthy collective consciences. The concept of minimum 
norms of a collective conscience of mankind may be considerably easier to justify in 
relation to crimes against humanity than in relation to the wider human rights agenda,52 
but the leap to trial proceedings and incarceration does not automatically follow. Even if 
one accepts the problematic idea that Durkheim’s characterization of penal law in 
primitive societies could have applications in the contemporary global context, it does not 
answer the question about how the definite organ, in the form of international criminal 
courts and their functionaries, is in touch with either global or more specific local 
common consciences. 
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   One way out of this problem is to take Durkheim’s hint that courts do not just reflect a 
common conscience, but also help to shape it. They become the agent of and substitute 
for values. According to Cotterrell, courts have “the specific task of coordinating and 
structuring diverse moral milieux into an overall social unity.”53 Through a “carefully 
managed drama of presentation and examination of evidence, formal procedures, and role 
playing,” they enable a “successful denunciation of a transgressor against social norms.54 
This would at least theoretically suggest that when there is no firmly established social 
order, which may often be the case during or after crimes against humanity have taken 
place, courts could contribute to shaping one. Clearly, however, the existing courts and 
tribunals have not been unambiguously successful in doing so. In this reading, the task 
for international criminal courts would be daunting but clear: they would need to get 
better at using discourses and symbols that resonate with affected societies, which they 
may then help unify. 
 
B.  Penal Law 2.0: Autonomy and Formal Rationality 
 
In his extensive analysis of law in economy and society, Max Weber actually has very 
little to say about criminal law. His emphasis is much more on contractual law and 
dispute resolution as the basis for rational exchange. Nonetheless, he gives an 
unambiguous answer to the question posed by this essay. Indeed, it could be argued that 
the influence of his mode of thinking on generations of legal professionals, providing an 
orientation away from the primitive-solidaristic one, has caused the question to arise in 
the first place. He believed democratic administration to be impossible in all but the 
smallest groups. In any more complex societal form, either a new class of professionals 
(honoratiores) or a single-headed hierarchy will re-emerge.55 
   Three idealtypes of domination find expression in three forms of legitimation: (1) 
rational, through bureaucracy; (2) traditional, through patriarchy; and (3) charismatic, 
through concrete individuals. Modern Western law is, in this account, almost exclusively 
associated with rational-bureaucratic domination. (Interestingly, Cotterrell places the 
projection of images of impartiality and objectivity by the legal profession in the 
charismatic rather than the rational category. Such charismatic projection would indeed 
appear to play a role in the behavior of certain prosecutors of courts and tribunals.56) 
   In modern Western society, rational domination through the formal law of fixed 
abstract concepts has emerged as suited to the purpose of the rationality of capitalist 
society. The content of the rules does not matter; order and predictability are prioritized 
over any substantive sense of justice. In his definition, law is externally guaranteed by 
coercion, applied by a staff of people to bring about compliance. The administration of 
justice is self-justifying, a technical imperative, not a moral search. This view echoes 
Hegel’s characterization of state-administered justice: “(t)hose who administer justice are 
persons, but their will is the universal will of the law and they intend to import into the 
punishment nothing except what is implied in the nature of the thing.”57 While Weber’s 
analysis appears mostly descriptive and sometimes critical, the final paragraph of his Law 
in Economy and Society leaves little doubt of how he would respond to the demands for 
democratic deliberation at issue in this article: “The rational course of justice and 
administration is interfered with not only by every form of ‘popular justice,’ which is 
little concerned with rational norms and reasons, but also by every type of intensive 
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influence of the course of administration by ‘public opinion,’ that is, in a mass 
democracy, that communal activity which is born of irrational feelings and which is 
normally instigated or guided by party leaders or the press.”58 
   The influence of this view of any outside interference as pernicious to legal deliberation 
is well-expressed by a U.S. lawyer quoted in Becker: “The moment a decision is 
controlled or affected by the opinion of others or by any form of external influence or 
pressure, that moment the judge ceases to exist. One who pronounces a decision arrived 
at even in part by other minds is not a judge.”59 More recently, Aaron Fichtelberg has 
expressed himself in similar terms with specific reference to international criminal courts: 
“(t)here are too many technical factors which are only available to the diligent legal or 
forensic expert—too many facts to weigh and balance in determining the guilt or 
innocence of the accused…for democracy to be a concern in criminal trials.”60 
   Nonet and Selznick explain the rationale for this profound emphasis on autonomy and 
technical expertise as a reaction to “the arbitrary decision-making of an earlier era…the 
stress is on barriers and dividers–to wall off the particularistic influences of kinship or 
personal influence, to insulate administration from politics, to sustain the integrity of 
officialdom.”61 
   While more attacked than honored in social theory, formal rationality continues to exert 
an important influence over legal practice. Niklas Luhmann’s theory of autopoiesis has 
gone a long way to explaining this: he discusses law as a self-referential system that 
“adopts always its own normative criteria which in themselves owe nothing to its 
environment.”62 Although it can take note of socio-political events, it can only evaluate 
them in its own terms: legal/illegal, right/wrong. Luhmann sees this ever-developing self-
referentiality as the law’s response to complexity. 
   Autopoiesis offers some intuitive explanatory value for the behavior of courts and 
tribunals. Certainly the ICTY, the ICTR, and the ICC acted in an extraordinarily 
autopoietic manner in their early years. But the puzzle of this examination is not so much 
the initial behavior, but rather the challenges to it, and how far international criminal 
courts can go in responding to these challenges. The pessimism of autopoiesis does not 
explain the steps taken by courts and tribunals (operating in hyper-complex 
circumstances) thus far. It offers no guide as to how far the engagement can or should go. 
   Weber’s choice of predictability over substantive justice, and his categorical rejection 
of any form of societal influence on legal professionals, may be hard to swallow for the 
democratic twenty-first century reader. But his precepts can certainly be considered 
applicable, if not universally acceptable, to the circumstances faced by international 
criminal courts. These circumstances are characterized by essential—and very violent—
contestation of every form of domination. The crisis of legitimacy is both a cause and a 
consequence of crimes against humanity. Far from rational legal domination, at least 
some of these situations (the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo springs to mind) 
are characterized by complete lawlessness. Moreover, as Fichtelberg has pointed out in a 
powerful plea for prioritizing procedural fairness over the democratic legitimation of 
international criminal justice, massive human rights abuses may be democratic in the 
minimal sense of enjoying majority support.63 In these circumstances, emphasis on 
procedure and predictability, even only within the very limited domain covered by 
international criminal courts, may be as much a contribution to the restoration of these 
societies as any attempt to do substantive justice. In this reading, international criminal 
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courts should stick to what they do best: interpreting right and wrong, and crime and 
punishment, consistently and predictably on their own terms. 
 
C.  Penal Law 3.0: Responsive Law 
 
1.  Deliberative Democracy and Criminal Courts 
 
While Luhmann critically developed Weber’s autonomous formal rationality in its pure 
form, other mainstream theorists have long put it into perspective. For Talcott Parsons, 
autonomy was “a finely balanced and inevitably precarious condition” that needed to be 
counterbalanced with recognition of the interdependence of law and society. Bredemeier 
refined this idea of interdependence with the theory of a series of exchanges between 
polity, citizenry, and the legal profession, in which the courts give citizens conceptions of 
justice as an element of their socialization, while citizens give courts “acceptance and 
use” (i.e., legitimacy).64 
   Nonet and Selznick have gone a step further, describing autonomous legal procedure as 
a phase that is, or ought to be, passing (in Western democracies, an important 
qualification!). In the face of demands for more than procedural justice, courts  “should 
help define the public interest and be committed to the achievement of substantive 
justice.”65 They should be results oriented and dare to depart from the classic image of 
justice blind to consequences.66 Their idealized responsive institution “perceives social 
pressures as sources of knowledge and opportunities for self-correction.”67 
   Jürgen Habermas appears, at a higher level of abstraction, to follow a similar 
categorization of law and its relation to politics and morality as Nonet and Selznick’s 
three-phase model. After discussing at length Weber’s account of the move from 
traditional to formal-rational justice, Habermas critiques Luhmann’s analysis of the self-
perpetuation of autonomy.68 On the contrary, “the adaptations that an increasingly 
complex society demands of a legal system forces the transition to a cognitive style, that 
is, to decision making which is context sensitive, flexible, and prepared to learn” (255). 
He makes a distinction, very pertinent to the preoccupation of this essay, between acting 
on universal interests, which is the law-maker’s job, and the “context-sensitive 
application of norms” by judiciaries, in which the moral imperative is to “take into 
consideration all relevant aspects of a given situation” (277). The “normative validity 
claim” of a legal judgment can be “vindicated only through argumentation” (279) that 
goes beyond legal casuistry. 
   This communicative need becomes greater the more the legal institution intrudes into 
the “lifeworld.” In a different text, Habermas implies, although more or less in 
parentheses, that criminal justice falls very much into this category: “regulation of those 
criminal offences close to morality (e.g., murder, abortion, rape, etc.)…need substantive 
justification, because they belong to the legitimate orders of the lifeworld itself and, 
together with the informal norms of conduct, form the background of communicative 
action.”69 One may conjecture that this would a fortiori be true of crimes against 
humanity. On the other hand, it must be noted that in his magnum opus Between Facts 
and Norms, Habermas insists on strict adherence to the separation of powers, situates his 
famous discursive democratic model primarily at the level of law-making, and assigns to 
the judiciary the task of guaranteeing certainty of law as well as “rational acceptability.”70 
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   Moving beyond his original adherence to critical legal theory, Roberto Unger goes 
considerably further. After condemning what he considers to be a “profoundly anti-
democratic” fascination with the choices faced by judges, he argues that, “the jurist, no 
longer the imaginary judge, must become the assistant to the citizens. The citizen rather 
than the judge must turn into the primary interlocutor of legal analysis.”71 More 
concretely, the courts should do this through the “context-oriented practice of analogical 
reasoning” and a “commitment to seek guidance in the mentalities and vocabularies of 
the real political world.” They should be “guided by ideals of concern for litigants as real 
people” and the “goal of advancing the power of a free people to govern themselves” 
(115). While it is worth recognizing that Unger, like Nonet and Selznick and Habermas, 
is writing in and of the context of an advanced and stable democracy, his final word on 
the ideal structural conditions required to fulfill these aspirations are eerily familiar to 
those who know the emerging literature on courts and tribunals. The judiciary as it is, he 
writes, can only provide a kind of stop-gap justice “so long as we fail to establish a 
distinct branch of government…with more democratic accountability and greater 
investigative, technical, financial, and administrative resources than the traditional 
judiciary now enjoys” (118). 
   Pablo De Greiff has applied the deliberative vision to criminal law in particular. What 
he offers is not so much a democratic theory of punishment as a democratic theory of 
trials, which can be seen as an expression of deliberative reason-giving that could, in 
principle, persuade the victims, the public, and even the offender of the version of affairs 
proposed by the judges, and if applicable, the justness of the punishment in light of the 
offense.72 
 
2.  Legal Pluralism 
 
The theorists discussed so far, whether addressing ancient, modern Western, or 
“primitive” non-Western models of law, nearly all conceive of societies as coherent, 
bounded social realities, matching the boundaries of the polity. Nowadays, of course, 
social science is concerned with overturning what is considered an outdated, statist 
paradigm. Legal pluralism, an orientation in legal anthropology, has long cast doubt on 
this “emphasis on sovereignty and centralization”73 in relation to the law in post-colonial 
societies. While Leopold Pospisil’s “patterned mosaic of sub-groups,” each with their 
own legal system,74 could still be read as an adaptation of Durkheim’s bounded societies, 
legal pluralism shatters the illusion that legal systems have natural boundaries, either 
within or across societies.75 It recognizes that different and often competing legal systems 
exist side by side, which may de facto give people an option of legal forum “shopping,” 
even if the systems themselves do not recognize each other. First applied to the co-
existence of traditional and colonial law, the study of legal pluralism is now equally 
concerned with the direct intrusion of international law, and even more concretely, 
international institutions, into interpersonal relations.76 In these terms, the existence of 
international criminal law, which arrogates to itself the right to put on trial local 
sovereigns, can be considered an extreme manifestation of legal pluralism 
(notwithstanding the attempts of state officials and legal experts to keep chaos at bay with 
the mantra of complementarity). 
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   In itself, legal pluralism as a field of study does not provide concrete recommendations 
for the communicative behavior of international criminal courts. It does, however, make 
visible certain dynamics that are important for them to consider. It demonstrates not just 
that there are multiple legal systems in operation, and that these may conflict with each 
other, but also that each of these systems is dynamic and subject to interpretation and 
reinvention. It is beginning to show that these processes typically take shape in 
circumstances of highly unequal power relations and all sorts of vested interests.77 
Finally, it begins to chart how and when legal pluralism can be empowering or 
disempowering to its subjects/agents.78 Prosecutors and judges in international criminal 
courts might be able to strengthen the empowering dynamics by orienting themselves not 
just to the socio-political and cultural environment, but also to the wider legal 
environment they operate in, without reifying what appear to be the tenets of local 
tradition.  
 
3.  Some Concrete Proposals 
  
By and large, the few contributions connecting deliberative democratic theory to judicial 
practice have concerned themselves only with domestic courts. Legal pluralism makes 
important contributions to our understanding of complex, globalized social realities, but 
tends to shy away from recommendations, especially universalistic ones. 
   James Bohman, in the first tradition, has made an argument vesting the legitimacy of 
international criminal courts in membership rights to a universal political community. On 
this basis, he insists that such courts must be democratically accountable along 
deliberative lines: “the requirement of freedom from subordination and mutual 
dependence must be applied to the very institutions that promote the conditions of 
freedom. This is simply a matter of the sort of reflexivity and political egalitarianism that 
is instituted in democracy.”79 Like the other theorists, however, he offers little practical 
guidance on how this “simple matter” is to be given shape in the daily practices of the 
courts. One hint he throws out is the possibility of a jury system (577). 
   Gaston, Lingle, and Deess have elaborated just such a scheme. They present flexible 
use of a jury as a powerful antidote to the ICC’s legitimacy deficits, for instance when 
“the perception of victor’s justice is particularly acute or where the Court’s intervention 
is hotly contested by populist critics.”80 They give a thought-provoking hypothetical 
example of how this might work in the context of a case adjudicated in the aftermath of 
ethnic conflict. A jury could be made up half of local members, who represent a mix of 
relevant ethnic communities, and half of international members. It would decide, by a 
majority of both halves, not on guilt or innocence but on the sentence (85). As a result, 
“(t)he final decision on sentencing would be the product not only of rigorous deliberation 
but also compromise across key social rifts”(86). 
   Other practices and proposals, made in domestic contexts, might also be applied 
internationally. Philip Pettit has suggested, in the U.S. context, that general guidelines on 
sentencing could be set by penal policy boards, which would “include experts in relevant 
areas of law and criminology, but also community representatives: say representatives of 
associations like victims’ groups, prisoner rights movements, different ethnic or religious 
blocks, and so on.”81 Pettit presents such a board in response to what he sees as an 
“overdemocratized” U.S. system, where an “outrage dynamic” engenders ever-heavier 
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sentences, but it might also serve in response to the democratic deficit of criminal justice 
at the international level. 
   In a project to describe and further forms of engagement between different legal 
systems in such a way that they empower indigenous communities, Melissa Williams 
discusses “experiments in ethical hybridity,” “recognized by both communities as 
(relatively) just.”82 In dealing with criminal cases concerning members of Canada’s First 
Nations, panels of elders and sentencing circles of stake-holders can be called upon by 
state-sanctioned judges, who have discretion as to whether to follow their 
recommendations (473). While many concerned minor-level offenders, some of these 
schemes dealt with more serious offences, such as incest or child abuse. 
   Such schemes leave many questions unanswered, and many criticisms may be raised 
against them. In most contexts, they are unfamiliar institutions, untested in terms of 
legitimacy effects. Should the people serving on penalty boards, juries, or sentencing 
circles be ordinary people or members of local elites? Would they be willing to take up 
such tasks? Might this not put them at risk or under pressure? Even more problematic is 
the issue of devising procedures for the appointment or election of representatives of such 
citizen bodies. It can never be unproblematically assumed that community leaders, civil 
society figures, or victims’ representatives actually represent the views and preferences of 
wider groups in society, and this is even less the case in the aftermath of crimes against 
humanity. With every voice that is given official status, other voices might be excluded. 
   Finally, the schemes discussed all limit democratic influence to the issue of sentencing. 
Many of the heated controversies surrounding international criminal courts concern not 
sentencing, but whether the prosecution of particular people—and not others—is in the 
interest of justice at all. Nonetheless, these designs do begin to translate the need to 
respond to the democratic deficit of international criminal courts (for those who believe 
there is such a need) into concrete plans for consideration and adaptation. 
 
VII. Conclusion: But is it Enough? 
 
The legitimacy deficit of international criminal courts is over-determined. The 
justificatory basis for the administration of criminal justice is weak in stable, prosperous, 
liberal democracies. The stronger reality of legal pluralism in post-colonial states further 
weakens it. The idea of values held in common, of which criminal justice could be an 
expression, is further compromised in societies where mass violence has recently 
occurred. Finally, even if there were still such a common cultural legacy, international 
prosecutors and judges could not be expected to know or understand it. 
   Hence, the analytical purchase of the theories presented above is limited. Nonetheless, 
they offer a few points of departure for theorizing the relationship between courts and 
affected populations, and the call for democratic legitimacy. First of all, it is important to 
note that there is no parallel in either classical or critical legal sociology, or legal 
anthropology, for the notion that direct democratic legitimation, expressed by Branch in 
deliberative and by Drumbl in franchise terms, is required for the legitimacy of 
international criminal courts. 
   Marxist and post-structuralist orientations offer a healthy skepticism about whether 
international criminal courts can ever be anything other than institutions that supply 
legitimacy to (global) domination, as opposed to institutions that require and ought to 
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seek a social basis for legitimacy. Beyond this, and only if they are read not entirely in 
the spirit in which they were intended, they pinpoint a route through which international 
criminal courts might (occasionally) destabilize power relations and legitimate the claims 
of those most marginalized in their own contexts. 
   Arguably, we may have seen something of this nature in trials dealing with sexual 
crimes and, more problematically, child soldiers. If there is any prescriptive value in this 
observation, it would counsel courts to cultivate this function instead of fulfilling it 
despite themselves, and to seek out and bestow legitimacy on particularly marginalized 
groups in the form of redress. This would require a great deal of sensitivity on the part of 
court staff in assessing the balance between potential emancipatory effects and the 
potential risks that destabilizing the status quo might pose to its would-be beneficiaries. 
   The Weberian emphasis on autonomy and generality would counsel international 
criminal courts to stick to their guns and provide post-conflict societies with an 
unflappable integrity and predictability, which is likely to have been in short supply in 
the recent past. It may well be the case in practical situations, of course, that this advice 
would run directly counter to the instrumental aspiration to strengthen marginalized 
groups, as formulated above. Whether such a formal-rational orientation could, or should, 
strengthen its potential effect by “explaining itself” depends on how absolute is the 
insistence on autonomy. In its more extreme, autopoietic form, the legal system is unable 
to function in any other than self-referential terms. Consequently, outreach would be a 
waste of time and resources. Yet the increasing emphasis of the existing courts and 
tribunals on outreach would suggest that they are not content to be purely self-referential. 
   A return to ideas of a collective conscience, while running dangerously close to 
unreflexive reliance on natural law, could have advantages if constructed as a problem 
within the remit of international criminal courts, rather than a predetermined basis for 
legitimacy. This would entail, first, a recognition that formal rationality is not enough and 
criminal justice must resonate in terms of moral meaning. Second, it would recognize 
legal pluralism as a reality and an advantage in terms of the social mission of 
international criminal courts. But thirdly, it would also recognize that any sense of 
collective conscience would likely be in disarray after crimes against humanity have been 
committed, and that the legal pluralism to be found in these circumstances would have a 
different, more traumatized character than in other socio-political contexts. 
   Finally, theories of responsive law and communicative theory offer points of departure 
for international criminal courts to open themselves up. This would entail a recognition 
that socio-political analysis, dialogue with affected groups and individuals, and 
application of the logic of consequences are not dangerous distractions from the sacred 
duty of dispensing justice, but an essential part of the dirty job of trying to do justice. 
They may open the door to institutional (re)designs that systematically offer carefully 
circumscribed citizen deliberation in certain stages of adjudication. 
   None of these suggestions amount to a handy blueprint, or even a practical guide, for 
the conduct of international criminal courts. This is hardly surprising. A legal sociology 
of responses to crimes against humanity is, if it exists at all, in its infancy. But the courts 
and tribunals currently in operation need more work of this kind if they are to survive the 
challenges against them.  
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